From the category archives:

Civil Justice System

Here are some brief points to keep in mind if you’re ever faced with litigating a Fair Labor Standards Act case and you think it might be appropriate to bring it as a class action.

  1. Technically, there is no class action mechanism in a Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) case. Per the FLSA, class actions are called “collective actions.”
  2. In a FLSA collective action, class members have to opt in. In Rule 23 class actions, generally speaking, absent class members are automatically in the class, but may opt out.
  3. The filing of a class action complaint tolls the statute of limitations for absent class members. The filing of a FLSA collective action does not toll the statute of limitations for other class members. Their statutes of limitations continue to run until they formally consent to be included in the collective action.
  4. In Rule 23 class actions, the court engages in a comprehensive review of the rule to ensure that the prerequisites are met. In FLSA collective actions, the threshold inquiry is rather cursory.

The full text of the FLSA’s Section 216(b) can be found here and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is located here.

Herrington Law, PA is a consumer/personal injury litigation firm located in Jackson, Mississippi.

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In a 9-0 opinion, which can be found here, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.

In Trinity Mission Health and Rehab, LLC v. Ruth Lawrence, Mrs. Lawrence sued Trinity over the death of her husband. Trinity moved to compel arbitration claiming that Mr. Lawrence had signed an arbitration agreement. Further, Trinity argued that Mrs. Lawrence had signed the arbitration agreement and had authority to bind Mr. Lawrence.

The Court rejected both arguments and found that Mrs. Lawrence’s claims can proceed to a trial on the merits in circuit court, not arbitration. The opinion is good news for those of us fighting against the continual erosion of our jury system and the emergence of arbitration.

Good job to the lawyers representing Mrs. Lawrence and who briefed the case to the Court — Trae Sims and Ben White.

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In a matter of first impression, the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that a court, not an arbitrator, should determine the lawfulness of a class action ban in an arbitration agreement.

The decision in In Re: American Express Merchants’ Litigation can be found here.

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With humility and eagerness, I am joining the faculty of Solo Practice University, a web-based, virtual law school where law students and legal professionals can learn the “how-tos” of practicing law. I will teach a course on class action litigation.

Class actions play a vital role not only in our civil justice system, but also in society as a whole. Numerous beneficial changes to industry practices, political governance, and civil rights have been achieved through the class action device.

It is indeed an honor to now have the opportunity to share with others all that I have learned about Rule 23 class actions. Mine will not be a theory course. From the initial client interview to trial and all points in between, we’ll discuss Rule 23 inside and out and you’ll obtain the tools necessary to successfully litigate a class action. Like all the other classes at Solo Practice University, this is a how-to course.

While class actions can be immensely complex and time-consuming, solo practitioners litigate them every day. Through this course, I hope to equip other solos, or law students thinking of going solo out of law school, to handle Rule 23 cases.

Thanks to Susan Cartier Liebel for extending this opportunity to me. I look forward to it. We’re going to learn a lot and, hopefully, have some fun while we’re at it.

Below is the video introduction to my course.

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Score another one for consumers. In Missouri, the state “Court of Appeals in St. Louis found that part of a mandatory arbitration clause in QC Financial Services Inc.’s loan contracts was both ‘procedurally’ and ’substantively’ unconscionable.”

QC Financial Service’s Inc. operates as Quick Cash, a payday lender, in Missouri. The court correctly noted that class action bans in cases involving what amounts to small claims serve to “immunize a defendant” and “paralyze consumers,” which is unconscionable.

The full story can be found here.

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In a welcomed move, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that a party (American Express) that did not sign an arbitration agreement can not compel consumers to arbitrate their claims against that party.

Hopefully, this will help end the trend of sending consumer claims into arbitration when those claims do not arise from any contractual relationship between the parties. An article detailing the ruling is reprinted below.

2nd Circuit: Plaintiffs in Credit Card Antitrust Case Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate

Mark Hamblett
New York Law Journal
November 11, 2008
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Plaintiffs who claim a conspiracy by American Express to cover up an antitrust plot with other major credit card companies on foreign currency transactions won a victory as a federal appeals court said they cannot be compelled to arbitrate.

The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the plaintiffs could not be forced into arbitration because American Express was not a signatory to the MasterCard, Visa and Diners Club credit card agreements that included the arbitration clauses.

The court’s decision came in Ross v. American Express Co., 06-4598-cv, a related case to the multidistrict class action litigation, In Re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation, 01-md-01409, now pending before Southern District of New York Judge William Pauley.

In the multidistrict currency conversion case, cardholders are claiming that card companies and major issuing banks have engaged in a Sherman Act conspiracy to fix higher fees for transactions involving foreign currency.

In Ross, the plaintiffs are the same cardholders in the multidistrict litigation, but they are not American Express (Amex) cardholders. The Ross plaintiffs charged in their complaint that American Express plotted with the other major card companies “to fix, maintain, and conceal the artificially inflated” foreign currency fees at issue in the multidistrict litigation. They alleged that American Express was part of the “collusive arrangement between and among the MDL defendants” — in part by holding a series of meetings on including compulsory arbitration agreements “in an effort to impede consumer litigation.”

In the Ross case, Pauley held in 2005 that the plaintiffs could be compelled to arbitrate their claims, but only after a trial to determine the validity of the arbitration clauses.

The judge said “a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to that agreement to arbitrate a dispute where careful review … discloses that the issues the non-signatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed.”

The 2nd Circuit reversed in a decision by Judges Rosemary Pooler and Peter Hall and, sitting by designation, Eastern District of New York Judge David Trager. Pooler wrote for the panel.

“Arbitration is a matter of contract, but the plaintiffs have not entered into any contract whatever with Amex, let alone any contract containing an arbitration clause,” Pooler said.

So the question for the court was whether it would employ any one of a number of common law principles that would allow a nonsignatory to enforce an arbitration agreement, including equitable estoppel. The answer was no.

“The district court’s opinion improperly extends the principle of compelling arbitration through equitable estoppel to a situation where the requisite contractual basis for arbitration does not exist,” Pooler said.

Second Circuit cases applying estoppel against a party trying to avoid arbitration, she noted, have in common that nonsignatories have some kind of “corporate relationship” to a signatory, such as cases involving subsidiaries, affiliates and agents.

And the court has extended that concept beyond affiliated corporate entities to other situations, including where a nonsignatory to a construction contract could compel arbitration because it was explicitly required by the contract to perform certain tasks. That case was Choctaw Generation Ltd. P’ship v. American Home Assurance Co., 271 F. 3d 403 (2d Cir. 2001).

But there are limits, Pooler said, and those limits were exceeded here, because the case “utterly” lacked the “further necessary circumstance of some relation between Amex and the plaintiffs sufficient to demonstrate plaintiffs intended to arbitrate this dispute with Amex.”

Merrill G. Davidoff of Berger & Montague in Philadelphia represented the plaintiffs.

“We think some of the lower courts, including the lower court in this case were misapplying and ‘overapplying’ the doctrine of equitable estoppel to throw cases into arbitration that shouldn’t have been there and we think the court of appeals has appropriately reined in the application of that doctrine,” he said.

American Express spokesperson Joanna Lambert said the company was disappointed in the decision and was reviewing its options. Jonathan Jacobson of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati argued for American Express.

Source

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Please read the story below, reprinted in its entirety from the website of the Center for Justice & Democracy. The story is about contingency fees. Simply put, contingency fees allow lawyers to front the costs of litigation for clients who cannot afford to pursue their cases. The lawyer takes all the risk and does not get paid until the client gets paid.

Contingency fees are crucial to our civil justice system because they allow the courthouse to remain open for everyone regardless of how much money they have — remember, the courtroom is the only place on Earth where the poorest individual can stand on equal footing with the richest multi-national corporation. Contingency fee contracts must be upheld. We do not need judicial activism or legislation impinging on this vital entry point into the civil justice system.

If you hear of others talking about the evils of trial lawyers, remind them that trial lawyers and the contingency fee contract are the last line of defense for most individuals.

Judge Cuts Attorney Fees in Crash Award: Future Victims Could Pay

Imagine for a moment you are James McMillan—a forty-four-year-old former Fulton Fish Market worker in New York City and victim of the 2003 Staten Island Ferry crash which killed 11 people and injured scores more. On that horrible day, while standing near the ship’s bow, you are pinned facedown by debris and several bones in your spine are crushed, rendering you permanently quadriplegic. You now require the assistance of an aide for even the most basic activities. You also suffer migraine headaches and cannot regulate your body temperature, among other complications.

You know you need the services of a reputable attorney, but unfortunately, you are unable to pay for one since you have lost the use of your arms and legs and are totally unable to work. Luckily, Attorney Evan Torgan agrees to take your case on a standard contingency basis—that is, you pay nothing up front, and Torgan agrees to cover all litigation costs (which could total thousands, and perhaps even millions of dollars). In return, if you win, Torgan’s compensation will be one-third of your award. If you lose, Torgan will receive nothing.

The city initially offers to settle for a completely inadequate sum, but Torgan knows a lowball offer when he hears one—so he advises you to go to trial, and you agree. Following the trial, you are awarded 83 percent more than the city originally offered. But most importantly, you’re in a far better position to pay for the life-long expenses you will incur as a person who is completely paralyzed from the neck down.

Now put yourself in Attorney Torgan’s shoes. By any measure, you have done a magnificent job in obtaining justice for your client. Nevertheless, following the trial, the judge (Judge Jack B. Weinstein) inexplicably decides to reduce your fee to 20 percent—leaving you with roughly the same amount you would have received had you not invested your time and resources in preparation for trial, and simply accepted the city’s lowball offer.

Unfortunately, this is exactly what happened—and it could have a very chilling effect on the ability of future injury victims to obtain justice from the courts.

Simply put, if Weinstein’s decision is allowed to stand and/or signals some sort of new trend in judges inserting themselves into attorney/client fee agreements, attorneys may no longer be able to accept the risk of representing clients on a contingency. And even if they do, they’ll be tempted to settle immediately no matter how unfair the offer may be to the client, knowing that the resources they expend in preparation for a trial may never be recouped.

Thankfully, Weinstein stayed his judgment for 20 days to allow the parties to seek relief from the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. In the meantime, for the sake of injured people everywhere, let’s hope the 2nd Circuit responds appropriately to Judge Weinstein’s ridiculous fee ruling—by tossing it out with the other garbage.

Source

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The news article linked to below is not sensational in and of itself. It is newsworthy in that the current Mississippi Supreme Court has overturned a trial court’s order disallowing a case to be heard by a jury. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in its written opinion, ruled that the case should go to the jury. Hopefully, the pendulum is swinging back to a more moderate stance for this Court.

The article is in The Clarion Ledger here.

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Recently, a great letter to the editor was published on the need for Congress to pass a pending bill that would limit the abusive use of mandatory binding arbitration agreements in nursing home admission forms.

Our elderly family members and friends deserve access to the courthouse just as much as, if not more than, anyone else when they’ve been the victim of nursing home abuse. Mandatory binding arbitration agreements shut the courthouse door. Please contact your representative and senators and urge them to support this bill.

Letters – Nursing Home Disputes – NYTimes.com.

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A recent study found that employees who win their disputes against employers in arbitration are more likely to have their victory overturned by state courts than employers.

This is not shocking news, but it is yet more evidence that mandatory binding arbitration is skewed in favor of employers and corporations when they’re fighting against consumers.

An article on the study can be found here.

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